نقش مستقیم و غیرمستقیم عوامل نهادی در استقلال بانک مرکزی ایران

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دکتری، گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران

2 پسادکتری، گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده علوم اجتماعی و اقتصادی، دانشگاه الزهرا، تهران، ایران

10.22051/ieda.2024.45583.1386

چکیده

بر اساس ادبیات نهادگرایی، عوامل نهادی نقش مهمی در استقلال بانک مرکزی دارند. هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تأثیر مستقیم و غیر­مستقیم عوامل نهادی بر استقلال بانک مرکزی در اقتصاد ایران است. ازاین‌رو با استفاده از یک الگوی اقتصادسنجی بر مبنای مطالعات گاریگا و رودریگز[1] (2020) و دیماتو و همکاران[2] (2009) به بررسی اثر عوامل نهادی بر استقلال بانک مرکزی طی دوره زمانی 1400-1375 پرداخته شده است. همچنین در این مطالعه برهم­کنش متغیرهای مستقل مدل به‌منظور تحلیل آثار غیرمستقیم عوامل نهادی بر استقلال بانک مرکزی مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. نتایج پژوهش نشان می­دهد اگرچه رانت نفت به‌صورت مستقیم تأثیری بر استقلال بانک مرکزی ندارد؛ ولی به‌صورت غیرمستقیم (از طریق ایجاد فساد و تورم) موجب کاهش استقلال بانک مرکزی می­گردد که این امر نشان از ضعف کیفیت نهادی و سیاست­های پولی در اقتصاد ایران دارد. بر اساس یافته­های مطالعه حاضر پیشنهاد می­شود در سیاست­گذاری­های اقتصادی برهم­کنش عوامل نهادی و همچنین کیفیت سازوکارهای نهادی به‌منظور دست‌یافتن به بانک مرکزی مستقل مدنظر قرار گیرد.
 
[1]. Garriga & Rodriguez
[2]. D'Amato et al.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Direct and Indirect Role of Institutional Factors in the Independence of Central Bank of Iran

نویسندگان [English]

  • Reza Fazelian 1
  • Farhad Tarahomi 2
1 Ph.D. Student, Department of Economics, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Isfahan University, Isfahan, Iran.
2 Postdoctorate, Department of Economics, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

According to the literature on institutionalism, institutional factors play an important role in the central bank's independence. The current research aims to investigate the direct and indirect impact of institutional factors on the central bank's independence in Iran's economy. Therefore, using an econometric model based on the studies of Garriga and Rodrigues (2023) and Dimato et al. (2009), the effect of institutional factors on the central bank's independence during the period of 1996-2021 has been investigated. Also, in this study, the interaction of the model's independent variables has been investigated to analyze the indirect effects of institutional factors on the central bank's independence. The research results show that although oil rent does not directly affect the independence of the central bank, it indirectly (through corruption and inflation) causes a decrease in the central bank's independence, which indicates the weakness of the institutional quality and policies. Based on the findings of the present study, the interaction of institutional factors and the quality of institutional mechanisms should be considered in economic policies to achieve an independent central bank

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Central Bank Independence
  • Institutional Quality
  • Corruption
  • ARDL Method

مراجع

منابع
صمدی، علی حسین؛ جعفری صمیمی، احمد؛ صدرایی جواهری، احمد و ابراهیمی، مسلمه (1400). تأثیر میزان استقلال بانک مرکزی بر ادوار تجاری سیاسی در ایران: کاربرد روش خودرگرسیون انتقال ملایم. مدلسازی اقتصادسنجی، 6(4)، 124-93.
طیب­نیا، علی؛ زمان زاده، حمید و شادرخ، مهدیه. (1393). نقش نهادها در بروز مصیبت یا موهبت منابع نفتی، یک الگوی رانت‌جویی با رویکرد تعادل عمومی تصادفی پویا. فصلنامه پژوهش‌های پولی-بانکی، 7(21)، 476-443.‎
لطفی، زهرا. (1399). اثر درآمدهای نفتی و توسعه سیاسی براستقلال بانک مرکزی: شواهدی از کشورهای صادرکننده نفت. پایان­نامه کارشناسی­ارشد رشته اقتصاد انرژی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس.
 
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