Analyzing the Tax evasion in Iran based on the Public Good Game Model: A Symbolic Micro Development

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 economic department Shahid Beheshti University

2 department of cognitive science, Beheshty University

3 Economic Department, Beheshty University

Abstract

Both behavioral economics and micro development have emerged from the 1970s, as new subdisciplines of economics. Their findings can help to resolve the hardships of underdevelopment in different countries including Iran. Meanwhile, a key underdevelopment factor in the Iranian economy is the lack of a standardized taxing system. In addition, a primary shortcoming of the taxing system in question is its huge tax evasion (which is actually estimated to be near 50%). Intending to analyze tax evasion in Iran, and by using a behavioural economic approach and experimental method (based on a public good game), this article is an investigation in this regard. The results indicate that Iranian citizens are ready to give up their self-interest in order to resolve a socioeconomic problem including tax evasion in their country. This finding is a symbol of micro development too. Also and potentially speaking, the findings of this article could be efficient policy implications for the Iranian government as well.

Keywords

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References

  • منابع

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