عقلانیت تکاملی و توسعه

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استاد دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

2 استادیار دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

چکیده

بیشتر اختلاف نظرها در حوزه های اقتصادی اجتماعی ناشی از درک نادرست از موضوع "عقلانیت" است‌  در این مقاله دو تبیین متفاوت از عقلانیت  ارائه می شود و توضیح داده می شود که " عقلانیت تکاملی" با توسعه سازگار است در حالی که ‌" عقلانیت ساخت گرا"  توجه را از نظم خودانگیخته بازار به مهندسی اقتصادی-اجتماعی معطوف کرده و از این طریق موجب انحراف ‌توسعه از مسیر تکاملی آن می‌‌شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Evolutionary Rationality and Development

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammadgholi Yousefi 1
  • Amrollah Amini 2
1 Professor of Allameh Tabataba'i University
2 Assistant Professor of of Allameh Tabataba'i University
چکیده [English]

Most differences in socio-economic opinions stem from misunderstanding the concept of “rationality. 
In this paper we present two different interpretation of rationality. We explain that “Evolutionary Rationality” is more conductive to development while “constructivist Rationality” divert attention from a free spontaneous market to socio economic engineering, thereby diverting development from its evolutionary path

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Evolutionary Rationality
  • Constructivist Rationality
  • Institutions and Development
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